* Por: Gabriela Gasperin
The United Nations define biological
weapons as “complex systems that disseminate disease-causing organisms or
toxins to harm or kill humans, animals or plants. They generally consist of two
parts – a weaponized agent and a delivery mechanism. In addition to strategic
or tactical military applications, biological weapons can be used for political
assassinations, the infection of livestock or agricultural produce to cause
food shortages and economic loss, the creation of environmental catastrophes,
and the introduction of widespread illness, fear and mistrust among the public”[1]. The “Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction”, that entered force in
1975 and is revised every five years, aims to control and eradicate biological
military threats – but, even if not all the members of UN ratified it, is aimed
mostly at states – when non-state agencies are most probable to make use of
this kind of weapon.
The development and use of biological
weapons in a terrorist setting can be split into three generations. The first
one, the simplest in terms of technology, is the use of naturally infected with
biological – harmful materials. South-American native tribes - especially the
Waorani from Brazilian Amazonia – would infect the end of their arrows and
darts with poison extracted from plants and some animals. In the 1960’s, during
the Vietnam War, the Vietcong guerrillas used booby traps compost of sharp
bamboo stakes covered with feces to promote infections in the generated wound.
This set of traps were responsible for about 2 percent of the US personnel
losses and injuries during the war.
The second generation is categorized by the
ability to yield small portions of biological agents – although the
dissemination methods still are non-complex, such as contamination of food and
water or direct injection into the target. The most usual agent in this period
was the ricin, even if it’s not suitable for large-scale attacks.
The third generation of biological
terrorism possesses the technology to disseminate particles through an aerosol,
in a range of 1-10 microns. Since this technology is recent – surging around
the 1990’s – no group has perfect this kind of contamination – despite quite a
few attempts around the world. The most famous case of the third generation was
the anthrax attack after the 9/11 events – even if they did not use any sort of
bomblets or sprays.
It is surging a fourth generation, where
the attackers can modify existing agents through the advance of life sciences,
such as genetic engineering. No group has declared intention on using this kind
of technology, for it’s extremely complex and difficult. This possibility is
used only as a fear-inducing discourse, to this moment.
In 1990’s, the city of Wasco County,
Oregon, had some of its salad bars infect with the bacteria “Salmonella
typhimurium”. The CDC research about the case determined that the spreading
crisis was not fault of poor hygiene in the restaurants, but a deliberate
attack by the group called “Rajneeshees”. The cult contaminated the water used
in these restaurants with the intention of incapacitating Oregon voters – since
they sought positions into the government. It was discovered after that the
group – which had built a whole community – had contacts inside the Rajneesh
Medical Corp., where it was being researched not only the salmonella agent but
a deadlier strain of typhoid and even an HIV virus more easy to contaminate.
More than 750 people were affected – in a city with around 10.000 habitants.
In 1994, the Japanese cult “Aum Shinrikyo”
released then nerve gas sarin in the city of Matsumoto and, 1995, the gas was
once again released on Tokyo’s subway system. In these occasions, they killed
nineteen people and injured over a thousand. Despite these cases of success –
and the technological and monetary resources the group had – the failed in
creating an aerosolized weapon that could cause mass causalities. Despite being
a religious-rooted group with apocalyptical beliefs, they indented to overthrow
the Japanese government – which did not work, either.
After the 11/9 attacks, the most famous
biological terrorist attack took place. In September and October of 2001, seven
letters – addressed to Senators Thomas Daschle (D-SD) and Patrick Leahy (D-VT),
as well as five media outlets (American Media International (AMI) in Boca
Raton, Florida, the editor of the New York Post, Tom Brokaw at NBC, Dan Rather
at CBS, and ABC News) – were mailed, containing a dry powder of “B. anthracis”.
The attack caused twenty-two cases of infection, five of them fatal. These
letters also contaminated the postal system – due to the process the letters go
through the facilities -, government buildings and media offices. The total
cost for decontaminating was at least $250 million dollars, and the total cost
of the attack was estimated in $6 billion. After a long investigation by the
FBI, the researcher Bruce Ivins was found the main suspect in the attacks – but
he was never held in court since he committed suicide before that. Also,
radical-Islamist movements might be involved in the case.
Despite the limited number of examples in
history of biological weapons being put in action, this issue is still a threat
to the international system – especially when considering the possibility of
bioterrorism.
The terrorist agencies represent a “second
force” against the power of the state, working in a different measure to
compensate its complications against the national, well-stabilised power. One of the main characteristics that
differentiate the terrorist’ actions is the element of surprise, the core of
this kind of process. The idea of striking abruptly is to, not only catch the
targeted population or government without them having time to build a comeback
strategy, but to generate attention. Usually the procedure is aimed to lead the
sympathy of certain groups, at the same time where they instigate fear in
communities considered “enemies”.
Over the situation, the policymakers –
usually the government, those in charge of starting the process of
securitization – start building a discourse of aggressively towards the threat,
which, if well-built, leads to exceptional measures being taken to regenerate
peace and security.
The process of generating fear is key to
most of terrorist acts, since it brings commotion and leads the population to
pressure their governments into acting – whether declaring the group as an
enemy, and therefore legitimizing their efforts as self-defence or generating
allies, especially inside the western countries.
In a process like this, the use of
biological weaponry is considered, by most people, as a “barbaric way”. The
horror we, humankind, feel towards sickness and those using them as warfare
tools create an opportunity to generate discomfort and panic over the targeted
- a goal most of the terrorist groups
claim.
Unlike nuclear, chemical and other kinds of
mass weaponry, the biological agents used in attacks can be found in the
environment, most of the times in places targeted by the groups. The use of
genetic engineering by terrorist cells is low, since they require a level of
knowledge and physical capacity these units not often possesses.
Although, the advance of science and
technology, allied with the widespread of high-level education brings
opportunities to those desiring to acquire a biological weapon, since the
opportunity of finding someone that possesses the abilities are greater than
never.
Past experiences with biological weaponry
indicate the preference of toxins and bacteria over viruses, for they are
simpler to transport and maintain alive. The most common strains used by
terrorist groups are ricin, plague, tularemia, botulinum and anthrax, where the
FBI notes that ricin and botulinum toxin are two of the most toxic substances
in the world.
The biggest reason of why biological mass
weapons are so alluring for terrorist unities is that it is a relatively
low-cost technology. Most of the major universities have labs equipped enough
to this purpose and the core is found in the wild without much trouble. Again,
the information available on internet is enough to create simpler weapons, and
the training many individuals possesses is competent to develop more
sophisticated ones.
In an event of biological attack, time is
precious. There’s a small window between the surging of the first infected and
the calamity, especially generated by the fear a biological attack would
generate. There’s already a strong setting dedicated to preventing and acting
in case of health events – such as hospital dedicated to controlling pandemics,
vaccinations and even simpler methods, such as face masks. Despite that, no
system is perfect, especially if we consider a covert attack that can be
misinterpreted as a regular spread of disease, such as the flu. Despite all the
modernization in the world we live in, the pathogens still exist along and, as
history already stated, they can – and sometimes will – be used as weapons, and
we may not be ready for when this happens.
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